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social workers followed the message, 
“when in doubt, pull them out.”
There is probably no more emotionally charged, politically 
volatile or perplexingly complicated area of state and local 
public policy than child protective services. The choice of 
whether to pull a child out of a home – with the attendant 
trauma to everyone involved – or to leave that child at 
home and possibly in danger, has to be one of the toughest 
balancing acts ever asked of state and local government.
As tough as that might be, in 2001 critics charged that 
the state of Maine had lost its balance. In the wake of a 
high-visibility child fatality, the state came under national 
scrutiny for its child welfare and protective services 
practices. A Frontline special told a devastating story: A 
5-year-old girl, Logan Marr, had been taken from her 
young mother under claims of neglect.1 She was placed in 
foster care with a former Maine child welfare worker who 
eventually would be convicted of manslaughter in the girl’s 
death. It was the first foster child fatality in Maine’s child 
welfare system in a decade.
High-profile and angry public hearings in the aftermath of 
the fatality laid bare a system reviled by many of those it 
was supposed to be serving. Critics charged that Maine was 
too aggressive in pulling children out of their homes; too 
secretive, bureaucratic and legalistic in the way it treated 
children and parents after a child had been removed; 
and ultimately indifferent to both the short- and long-
term consequences of removing children from familiar 
surroundings and placing them in the custody of strangers.
Although in 2001 Maine was in a harsh media spotlight, 
the state’s approach to child protection was not all that 
different from practices in plenty of other jurisdictions.
The potential fallout from leaving a vulnerable child in 
what might be perceived as an even slightly dangerous 
home is significant. When considering the tradeoff – 
sensational headlines about abuse or neglect when the 
state failed to act, versus the invisible trauma of removing 
a child from a home – removal was frequently the default 
course of action.
In Maine’s case, many say the inclination toward removing 
children was substantially increased by another fatality, this 
one outside the child welfare system. In the mid-1990s, 
the state failed to take custody of a child despite clear and 
long-standing evidence of danger. In the wake of that death, 
social workers followed what they heard as a clear if not 
official message: “When in doubt, pull them out.”
“What evolved was a reactive and incident-based approach 
to protecting children, where you go in and whip the 
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children out of their homes and then figure out what they 
need,” said Gretchen Robbins, a former state child welfare 
worker, now with the Child Welfare Training Institute, 
a University of Southern Maine-based human services 
training and technical assistance consultancy.
The decision to remove a child is, of course, just the 
beginning of a complex set of actions and consequences 
that play out when the state takes custody. Another action 
with major consequences for children: With a shortage 
of foster homes in Maine, the placement option of first 
choice often was a group home or other institution.
Congregate care settings often were in far flung parts of the 
state, and for a very simple reason, noted Dan Despard, 
former regional manager in the child welfare division and 
now director of child welfare. “It was primarily driven by 
residential providers seeking the cheapest building and 
labor costs.” These facilities were significant employers in 
rural areas.
Because many congregate care institutions were distant 
from a child’s home, school and community, the sense of 
dislocation for children was much greater. Furthermore, 
once a child was placed in care, a requirement that 
caseworkers make safety and well-being visits every three 
months was being roundly ignored, according to Michael 
Brennan, a former Maine state senator who is now a policy 
associate with the Institute for Child and Family Policy.2 
Follow-up outside of formal legal proceedings and hearings 
became an uncertain proposition.
Lack of state attention following placement meant that 
institutional players such as congregate care providers and 
social workers had substantial influence over the fate of 
children in their care. There was no incentive to move 
children out of custody to permanence and reunification. 
Complicating matters, institutional providers that wanted 
to release children were unlikely to find alternative 
placements. Worse, Maine had come to rely on federal 
reimbursements from Medicaid to pay for placements, 
and in Maine these reimbursements were only available if 
a child was diagnosed with mental or emotional problems. 
That resulted in more – and often clinically questionable – 
placements in congregate care.
Within the Maine child welfare system, reinforcing incentives 
led to frequent placement of children in institutions offering 
therapeutic care. First, the federal government was paying 
a sizeable portion of the cost. Second, space was widely 
available. Third, there was an effort to bring back to Maine 
some 200 children who had been removed from their homes 
and placed out of state. The simplest solution was to rely 
on institutional settings. As a result, a large industry of 
congregate care providers became rooted in Maine.
As data would later indicate, congregate care simply is 
not an effective avenue to making sure a child is a legal 
member of a permanent family. To the contrary, children 
were languishing in institutional care for unacceptably long 
periods. By 2000, data showed that if a child spent any time 
in an institutional placement, his average length of stay 
jumped from 18 to 35 months. 
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congregate care simply is not an effective 
avenue to permanence.
The essential problem in Maine, while not easily solved, 
was arguably straightforward enough, said Pam Cote, an 
OCFS supervisor and 22-year veteran of the Maine child 
welfare system. Every report of abuse or neglect required 
an investigation. Every investigation required a finding, and 
that finding was generally either that the child was safe or 
that the child was at risk, one or the other, and nothing 
in between. If it was determined that the child was at risk, 
then the state took custody. When placing children, the 
state frequently “looked at residential care settings because 
there was no place else to go,” said Cote. Once the child was 
in institutional care, no state policies or practices required 
frequent, regular case review with the expressed goal of 
permanency or reunification. No incentives existed for 
moving children out of the system.
The result was a system that was clearly broken. Too many 
children were placed in institutional care, and many lingered 
too long. Reform was long overdue.
looking for a better way
As unacceptable as the situation was in Maine (the National 
Coalition for Child Protection Reform had spotlighted 
Maine’s child welfare system as one of the worst in the 
country), the state had two important things going for it in 
2001: a handful of leaders who understood that something 
had to change, and a key group of rank-and-file insiders 
who agreed.
“For me, removing a child from his or her home was the 
worst part of my job,” said Gail D’Agostino, a veteran 
caseworker in Bangor. “It’s horrible for everyone – and it 
should be horrible.”
“It seems like we were always in crisis mode,” said long-time 
caseworker Vicki Brayall, describing life at OCFS in the late 
1990s and early 2000s. “We didn’t work well with families 
and we didn’t pull in community support. We did all the 
protecting ourselves. We didn’t rely on others. And we didn’t 
share information. We operated as a closed institution to 
the exclusion of families. We lived in an atmosphere of if we 
knew something had happened to a child then we simply 
had to do something about it.”
Adding to the overall misery in Maine’s child welfare system 
was a clear institution-wide prejudice against placing children 
with relatives. The reason most frequently invoked within 
the system was the belief that “the apple doesn’t fall far from 
the tree.” D’Agostino recalled an incident that illustrates 
this bias at its worst: A little girl had been placed with her 
grandmother and was doing fine. “Our regional program 
manager found out the child was with the grandmother 
and insisted that without any notice we move the child, 
because how could this woman who had raised the abusive 
mom not be an abuser herself? And I just remember how 
wrenching that was for me emotionally, and for the child. 
It was just horrible.”
But if some thought change was needed, there wasn’t much 
clarity on what form change should take or how far reaching 
it should be. Even as other states were moving forward with 
significantly different models for child protective services, 
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Maine was wrestling with the question of whether its 
system needed tinkering or a complete overhaul.
Either way, supporters of reform understood one thing: 
They needed outside help to make the system work 
better for families. “Whatever changes were required,” 
said Martha Proulx, a long-time OCFS staffer who now 
oversees operations in Maine’s northern district, “I don’t 
think they could have been led only by someone on the 
inside, because of the people and the culture in place at 
the time.”
a new approach to change 
A potential outside partner in moving Maine in a better 
direction was the Annie E. Casey Foundation. At the time, 
Casey had been working with a number of states to instill 
child welfare system changes based on a set of principles and 
values it called “Family to Family” (F2F). Two principles 
underpinned F2F. The first was a push to fundamentally 
change how decisions about a child’s fate would be made, 
by bringing in more people to review and decide cases 
than had been the norm. Second, if it was decided that a 
child had to be removed from the birth parents, that child 
should remain in settings as familiar as possible, as close to 
the family’s neighborhood as practicable, or with extended 
family members.
“That was very different from standard practice,” said 
Kathleen Feely, vice president for innovation with the Casey 
Foundation. “The standard practice model in the early 
1990s was to ‘rescue’ kids out into the suburbs or even out 
of state to a ‘safer’ environment, away from family, friends, 
neighbors and their schools.”
Along with the Family to Family initiative came a new 
approach to case practice itself. Casey was advocating case 
practice that put children and families at the center of a 
collaborative, cooperative approach to child welfare and 
protection, one that involved multiple actors and not just 
caseworkers and their supervisors.
Under the new family-centered model, reports of suspected 
abuse or neglect triggered a much more measured approach 
by child welfare and child protective services officials than 
was typical. Rather than choosing immediately whether 
to take custody of a child or leave him or her with the 
parents, the agency brought together a team of players – 
caseworkers, supervisors, the family and child, friends, 
relatives, neighbors, teachers, clergy and counselors – to 
work out the least traumatic and most therapeutic decision 
about how best to keep a child physically and emotionally 
safe. Even in instances where it was decided a child should 
be removed, the Casey model emphasized proximity as part 
of the case plan.
The Casey model showed potential, but establishing it in 
systems that had for years been doing child protection and 
welfare the old-fashioned way wasn’t proving to be easy. 
At the time Maine called Casey, the Foundation had been 
working on a new reform model, one centered on a more 
intensive approach to helping child welfare systems change. 
With a long history of offering financial and technical 
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maine wrestled with the question of 
whether their system needed tinkering 
or a complete overhaul.
assistance to states and localities, Casey was evolving a new 
concept based on a more embedded approach to engaging 
with child welfare agencies.
It was called the Casey Strategic Consulting Group (CSCG).3
The idea was to pull together a team of experts – not just 
in child welfare, but also in systems change – to work 
within a child welfare system, at no cost to the client. The 
team would analyze the system’s problems and identify 
opportunities for change, while providing concentrated 
support, intelligence-gathering and assistance to pave 
the way for larger system reform. CSCG’s approach was 
modeled after business consultancies, such as McKinsey, 
to offer intensive strategic consultation.
building a partnership
Key to Casey’s engagement in Maine, of course, was that 
Casey staff, consultants and Maine officials first had to get 
to know one another. “It sounds simple but it’s true,” said 
Kathleen Feely, who spent considerable time in the state 
during the planning and design phases. “You have to build 
trusting relationships on both sides.” She and other CSCG 
team members dedicated the beginning of the process just 
to meeting and talking to as many child welfare officials and 
staff as possible. They also had support from the local Casey 
Family Services Division office headed by Mark Millar, who 
provided technical assistance. 
While some officials in Maine were tentative about the new 
arrangement, others immediately saw it as an opportunity. 
“I was excited,” said Dan Despard. “I had already reached 
the point of acknowledging that we needed to change.” 
However, other top managers both in the field and in the 
central office disagreed over whether Maine’s system needed 
to be dramatically reformed or simply “recalibrated.”
“Some OCFS officials were saying that the 2001 fatality 
was an isolated incident and that it wouldn’t happen 
again; that the system itself was basically sound,” said 
Michael Brennan.
There was also fundamental disagreement about the 
direction change – of whatever scale – should take. Some, 
like Despard, were ready to embrace a more family-centered 
approach. But doubts lingered among some upper-level 
managers and others in the system about the ability of 
families and relatives to protect kids adequately. In addition, 
Maine’s eight OCFS districts had gotten used to operating 
without much direct oversight from OCFS central offices in 
Augusta, the state capital.
In spite of the predictable conflicts, two initiatives were 
soon launched. The first created a leadership team of 
state child welfare officials to help guide and support 
the change effort. The second involved a retreat to work 
through the “principles, beliefs and values” on which the 
team wanted to build a new approach to children and 
family protective services.
The Casey consulting team and Maine officials also made a 
specific push to identify some fundamental organizational 
issues that seemed to be getting in the way of change. 
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For example, the central OCFS office in Augusta clearly 
needed beefing up in order to engage more effectively 
with the OCFS districts and implement new policies and 
strategies.
Despard also recalled that an early attempt to pilot 
Casey’s more family- and child-centered case management 
approach in two OCFS districts didn’t get much traction. 
He said the system generally wasn’t ready for that kind of 
change and that much more ground work needed to be 
done to change the overall culture at OCFS.
But significant progress did occur during the first two 
years of the Maine engagement, said Kathleen Noonan, 
a human services reinvention consultant who managed 
the initial work. “We spent a lot of time on the central 
office organizational structure and on building a leadership 
team,” she said. Shortly after arriving in Maine, in a 
decision that would prove crucial to the engagement, Feely 
and Noonan invited University of Chicago-based data 
analysts at Chapin Hall Center for Children and Families 
to help Maine review data on all children in its system, 
including where they were, how old they were, and how 
long they had been in state custody.
“One of the major things the state wasn’t doing was 
analyzing data,” said Lee Hodgin of the Child Welfare 
Training Institute. “We had an automated child welfare 
information system that had lots of information in it, but 
we didn’t know how to get it out, so Casey turned our data 
sets over to Chapin Hall.”
The Chapin Hall analyses painted a stark picture. One-
third of children in state custody were in some sort of 
institutional setting. Many had been languishing in those 
settings not for months, but for years. “The Chapin Hall 
study made clear that children were staying in care too 
long, a high percentage of them were in residential care, 
and we weren’t doing well by way of permanence,” said 
Frances Ryan. (Just before Casey’s arrival, Ryan had been 
involved in a major push to bring back to Maine all the 
children placed in institutions outside the state).
But Chapin Hall and CSCG did more than just deliver some 
sobering statistics. They also helped train OCFS staff to build 
Maine’s own capacity to do the kinds of statistical analyses 
that the state would need to track progress in the future. 
Casey also re-launched a major training initiative, this time 
with the state’s child welfare training academy, to train each 
state social worker in how to conduct a family team meeting 
before placing a child in foster care. Casey also helped the 
state set goals for reducing the number of children in out-of-
home care. OCFS began to use data to manage the system, 
comparing data by region in management meetings to tap 
into natural competition among managers and to facilitate 
cross-regional learning.
The Chapin Hall data analysis did accomplish two goals 
simultaneously: It began to change the day-to-day and 
face-to-face approach to child and family welfare in 
Maine. And it reshaped broad policies system-wide, such 
as those aimed at significantly reducing the reliance on 
congregate care as the placement option of first choice.
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putting the pieces in place
With the Chapin Hall data, proponents of reform – inside 
and outside the state’s system – now had a couple of clear, 
tangible goals: reduce the number of children in congregate 
care and increase permanent placements.
But while clear goals are necessary to achieve significant 
organizational change, goals alone are not enough. Without 
the right players in the right places at the right time, large-
scale change in any organization is often doomed. By 2004, 
a new group of leaders moved into key positions in Maine, 
people who would be absolutely essential to putting the 
state on an entirely new child welfare path.
In 2004, Dara Menashi arrived in Maine as CSCG’s new team 
leader. Menashi, a veteran of large system transformation 
initiatives, came with the clear conviction – proved through 
years of research and field practice nationwide – that 
congregate care often is over-used, and that children are 
almost always better off staying in or close to home in a 
family setting. Absolutely vital to the next phase of Casey’s 
engagement was that Menashi had important internal 
allies who shared her conviction.
Key personnel moved to the central office in Augusta 
around the time of Menashi’s arrival. They helped push 
the central office in a direction sympathetic to and in 
sync with a family- and child-centered approach to child 
welfare, and were more willing to consider close relatives 
as a viable placement option for at-risk children. Among 
those insiders were Dan Despard, who said he had been 
increasingly discouraged by Maine’s longstanding approach 
to child protection and welfare, and Frances Ryan, who 
had been working on the initiative to get out-of-state 
children back to Maine.
With clear goals in mind and a committed team in place, 
the push was on to establish a more family- and child-
centered system. The focus was to be on what was truly 
best for children and families. There would be less one-
size-fits-all decision making by default, and more involved, 
in-depth assessment of individual cases. Those assessments 
would focus on how best to help families get what they 
needed through a course of action that would be the least 
traumatic to children and families.
The next phase of reform brought changes in the way all 
Maine OCFS workers did their jobs. This would allow 
them to experience being part of a more humane, effective 
approach to child safety and welfare. 
Working with CSCG, OCFS proposed a plan to move 
100 children from congregate care to permanent homes. 
On August 20, 2004, Casey and OCFS convened what 
would become one of the milestone meetings of the 
entire reform effort.  Every institutional and congregate-
care provider in the state was invited to Augusta to learn 
about the new direction Maine was taking. “We brought 
in all the providers and told them that we were going to 
begin reducing our reliance on institutional care,” said one 
participant at the meeting. The providers’ response? “They 
were resistant.”
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even enlightened caseworkers discovered 
they were stuck in the old way of thinking.
Not all of them, however. The state had made very clear in 
its presentation that it wanted to work with providers as it 
moved forward, and an influential group of those providers 
not only understood what Maine was trying to accomplish, 
but also appreciated being included in the effort. While 
some providers did go to the state legislature to fight the 
initiative outright, or to the press to argue that the state was 
making a dangerous decision, a group of providers signed 
on to help. 
One of them was Jack Mazzoti, who runs Harbor Family 
Services, based in Topsham. “The biggest thing that has 
permeated the whole process was that throughout the 
congregate-care rightsizing initiative, the state engaged 
providers in the process,” he said. After the August meeting, 
Mazzoti became a member of a “reforming residential 
care” committee that worked with the state to figure out 
new protocols for placing children in institutions and ways 
that providers might retool their services to offer more 
out-patient therapy and community-based care. The new 
requirement was characterized by a simple catch phrase: 
“treatment, not placement.”
“Our input was valued,” said Mazzoti. “We showed 
that residential care was a critical component of a child 
welfare system, but that it should be used under stricter 
regulations and rules.” The cooperative give-and-take, he 
said, allowed his organization to develop a combination 
of residential and out-patient services that has kept 
him in business and that he agrees is better for children 
and families. 
Cost was a significant undercurrent in the whole debate 
over congregate care. While some data indicated that over-
reliance on congregate care was harming Maine’s children, 
what clearly resonated with legislators and the governor was 
the cost of institutional care versus outpatient care – 
$150,000 per year, versus $10,000. In explaining the 
far-reaching benefits of reducing congregate care, advocates 
noted that the state stood to save millions of dollars. 
Those savings, however, would become a point of tense 
negotiation between Casey and OCFS. In 2004, when Casey 
was renegotiating its terms of engagement with Maine, 
Foundation Vice President Feely insisted that in return for 
the Foundation’s continued help, the state set aside a specific 
amount of savings from reduced use of congregate care to 
invest in community-based care. Young people cannot be 
returned from group settings to live with families without 
support, and Feely knew there was no other way the state was 
going to fund the services. She wrote it into the Foundation’s 
engagement letter, which Maine officials signed. Over the 
next two years, more than $4 million was diverted from the 
congregate care budget to fund community-based services 
for families and their children. The estimated cumulative 
savings to the state of Maine for fiscal years 2005 through 
2007 was $19 million.
a plan of action
With Casey’s continued support and guidance, the OCFS 
in 2004 began working on three interlocking strategies in 
support of the congregate care initiative. First, Ryan and her 
team came up with a design for “permanency teams” that 
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the new ethic focuses on family problem 
solving and community-based supports.
would evaluate cases and brainstorm how to get children out 
of institutional settings. The teams, at least initially, would 
include providers. Second, OCFS, under the guidance of 
Despard, worked to revise key policies, refocusing them on 
increasing community placements and reducing the state’s 
reliance on congregate care. Third, OCFS had begun to do 
the important groundwork to figure out what new services 
would be required at the community level, including working 
with providers to retool for the shift from residential care to 
community-based services.
What Casey and the OCFS leadership banked on was that 
reducing reliance on congregate care would open everyone’s 
eyes to the possibilities and benefits of keeping children 
close to home; refocusing practice on permanence; and 
including children and families throughout the process. 
Unless OCFS staff from the front line to the top really 
understood and practiced those principles, fundamental 
and lasting transformation would be impossible. 
Instilling these principles in everyday practice turned out 
to be the most difficult piece of reform. In the fall of 2004, 
most OCSF workers were still committed to a model 
of child welfare that was top-down and paternalistic. 
Even enlightened caseworkers had discovered that they 
themselves were stuck in the old way of thinking. “My 
mindset was that I would devise the case plan,” said Gail 
D’Agostino. “The parents would come into my office. I 
would acknowledge disagreements. I would dutifully write 
them down, and then I’d make them sign it.” Heavy-handed 
and one-way, based on the near universal assumption that 
the state knew best and that families and children were 
“cases,” not “clients,” the old mindset still governed the 
way Maine’s child welfare system did business.
The biggest job, in other words, lay ahead: getting line 
supervisors and caseworkers to understand what the 
reduction in congregate care really meant: a whole new ethic 
of child welfare and child protection, one that centered 
on family problem-solving, where multiple players would 
be brought in to explore alternatives to removing children 
from their homes. If children had to be removed, then 
the system would aggressively explore options for keeping 
them nearby, preferably with a family member. 
The approach was based on a new world view that the 
state didn’t always know best; that with the right support 
and services, most families were capable of functioning 
at a level that would lead to safe, secure home lives for 
children; and that extended families frequently offered a 
viable alternative to removing children from their homes.
the tipping point
It is one thing to push for changes in attitudes and practice. 
It is another to show people how a reformed system might 
actually work. Having done extensive theoretical and tactical 
groundwork in Maine in 2004, Menashi and the Casey 
team did what everyone in OCFS now agrees cemented the 
proposition. They began to make it very real.
One of the tallest hurdles on the road to reform was the 
honest conviction among OCFS staff that they had placed 
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children in congregate care only when the children really 
needed it. As a first step toward dispelling that conviction 
and knowing that “seeing is believing,” Casey arranged a 
closed-circuit television broadcast of third-party interviews 
with a number of children in state custody. About 40 
Maine OCFS officials were watching.
“It was unbelievable what came out of these kids’ mouths. 
They knew what they needed and had resources on the 
outside that could help. They just had no access to those 
resources,” said Frances Ryan. The presentation showed 
one crushingly and even comically sad story after another 
about a system that had grown callous and deaf to the needs 
and potential of children. “There were Maine officials in 
that room who were shaking after that,” Ryan recalled.
Next, the CSCG team organized an even more ambitious 
initiative: two staff field trips in September 2004 to Utah, 
a state that was moving down the path toward a solidly 
child- and family-centered model of child welfare. 
Among the staff that traveled to Utah were Cynthia Sargent 
and Brian Walsh, both supervisors in the OCFS Portland 
office, along with members of the district’s newly formed 
residential review team. “For me, going to Utah was the 
beginning of actually seeing how you could involve families 
in this whole process,” Sargent said. “It was where I really 
saw that families had strengths as well as weaknesses.” 
Walsh agreed. “It was really a 180-degree turn in my view 
that every child deserved and could have a family.” It was 
in Utah, Dan Despard added, that the group saw “that 
everyone from front-line clerks to top managers was talking 
about this practice model based on family engagement – 
an entire practice model focused on engaging children and 
families and including them in the whole process.” 
“It turbo-charged us,” Walsh summed up. “We came back 
from Utah overflowing with ideas.”
Thus energized, a group of influential insiders came back to 
Maine to tackle the congregate-care rightsizing initiative. It 
wasn’t easy, though. At first they met some stiff resistance, but 
things began to turn around as the initiative moved forward.
“We were beginning to move children out of residential care 
and creating these wrap-around services for them and their 
families, and they were not coming back in. It was working,” 
Sargent said. “We started feeding off that success. We were 
getting children out of congregate care who nobody thought 
we could, and people were just amazed at the number of 
children we got back into their homes, and none of the bad 
things that people predicted would happen happened. The 
children did fine.”
One case captured the attention of the entire OCFS system. 
A particularly troubled and violent child was removed 
from congregate care and placed with his grandmother, 
with a safety plan and supports in place to help the family 
if and when the boy acted out. The transformation in his 
behavior and attitude was immediate and profound. “That 
case really got people’s attention,” said Despard, “and 
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really started to change people’s minds about whether this 
was the right way to go.” 
OCFS success rapidly snowballed: The department exceeded 
its goals, moving 111 children out of congregate care, 
including a significant number who moved in with relatives. 
The events also accomplished exactly what Casey and OCFS 
officials had hoped: They made believers out of skeptics.
Portland, which had taken the lead on reducing children in 
congregate care, became something of a Mecca. Front-line 
staff and supervisors streamed in from all over the state to 
see what Portland was doing, and saw a process that involved 
far more than just pulling children out of institutional care 
and achieving successful permanent placements. The agency 
was beginning to practice a whole new approach to child 
welfare, one that focused on involving families and children 
with OCFS to work through problems and issues as the 
option of first resort.
lasting transformation
Both insiders and close observers admit that performance in 
Maine continues to be uneven in places, but five years after 
the congregate care rightsizing initiative, transformation of 
the Maine child welfare system is substantially complete. 
“Casey was in Maine every week for three years,” said Feely. 
“But real reform takes a lot longer than that, and what’s clear 
is that Maine has the leadership in place to carry this on.” 
One clear indication that transformation is permanent 
and lasting, said Menashi, is that an already large number 
of staff at OCFS knows nothing of the old way of doing 
business or about Casey’s engagement, and yet they are 
completely inculcated into the new way of doing child 
protection and welfare.
She cited as an example the state’s new confidence in 
using data to shape policy, diagnose problems, and discern 
progress. In fact, managing by the numbers is a matter of 
routine and reflex to just about everybody in the system. 
“I’ve become this data geek,” laughs Martha Proulx. “I get 
excited when our numbers come out.”
Indeed, the numbers are impressive. In 2008:
•  Fewer than 2,000 children were in foster care, down from 
nearly 3,200 in 2001.
•  The number of children in residential care plunged nearly 
77 percent, to 200 from nearly 855 in 2003.
•  More than 500 children were placed with relatives, a 28 
percent increase from 2003.
•  The percentage of children reunified with their families 
within 12 months of the state taking custody jumped to 
nearly 60 percent from 40 percent in 2003. 4
Today, Maine has one of the lowest percentages of children 
in institutional care of any state. Further, it now does routine 
and regular reviews of each case to ensure children’s needs 
are met.
It’s a transformation that the National Coalition for Child 
Protection Reform has recognized by moving Maine from its 
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“worst case” list to its list of best practices. But the payoff, as 
many in Maine will tell you, is certainly not in the numbers, 
as impressive and powerful as those might be. It is in the 
stories behind them.
“I remember one case in particular,” said Pam Dubois, a 
caseworker supervisor in northern Maine. “I had just become 
a supervisor, and we had a 15-year-old with behavioral 
problems, and the case psychiatrist was recommending 
residential treatment. Instead, I went to local providers – 
mental health agencies – and asked what could be done. 
“We were able to get him services in the community, and 
within just a few months he had really improved. In the 
old days he would have been pulled out of his home and 
shipped off to some institution or other, far away from his 
family, far away from everything he knew. And he probably 
would have been there for a long time.”
conclusion
In Maine today, intervention occurs sooner and is aimed 
at healing whole families, not merely deciding where to 
house children who are potentially at risk. Family team 
meetings are routine. Placing a Maine child in congregate 
care now requires extensive review by multiple child 
welfare professionals who have to give prior authorization. 
Placements in institutional settings continue to decrease, 
stays are shorter, and many more children are connected 
with permanent families. Average caseload size per worker 
has decreased from 25 per worker in 2003 to 14 in 2008, 
allowing caseworkers more time to focus on quality work.
The reform effort continues with a sharp focus on results. 
Most importantly Maine’s involvement with children 
and families is far less confrontational and far more 
collaborative, with a mandate for better outcomes for all. 
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today, intervention occurs sooner and is 
aimed at healing whole families.
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